Many solutions for securing inter-provider handover proposed to date make use of the concept of security context transfer. However, none of these solutions addresses problems arising from subsequent handover. In this paper, we provide a formal model for subsequent security context transfer and define a set of security requirements. We furthermore present a new solution that meets all but one of these requirements. In particular, we combine the concept of a history-enriched security context transfer with a policy-based handover decision process.
Introduction
One of the main challenges in securing inter-provider handover is to allow for active mobile devices (MDs) to securely access a destination network (DEST) without causing perceivable interruptions of on-going connections. Handover generally includes some form of mutual authentication and authorization between MD and DEST as well as establishing cryptographic keys and negotiating security mechanisms to be used after handover. The most promising approach to meet the efficiency requirements imposed by handover procedures to date is to derive the cryptographic keys that will be used after handover from the ones used before handover and transfer these to MD's new point of network attachment. This kind of a security context transfer also includes the sending of the network's authorization for this particular handover.
The concept of Security Context Transfer (SCT) has been suggested previously (e.g., [9, 8, 1, 3, 2, 6] ) and is widely used for handover in mobile communication standards like GSM and UMTS. However, none of the previous work explicitly addresses the problems arising from subsequent inter-provider handover. In particular, subsequent context transfers make the protection of the connection after handover depend on the pro-tection of each connection between MD and a previously serving network. Moreover, previous work fails to meet the interest of previously serving networks in the negotiation of secure mechanisms to be used after handover. Instead, it is implicitly assumed that all network providers offer the same level of protection and that MD and DEST will try to maintain the protection level upon handover. This, however, is an unrealistic assumption as different providers will typically support different security mechanisms and-depending on the type of handover agreement-different providers will take different risks if weak mechanisms are used after handover.
In this paper we provide a formal model for subsequent context transfers and define a new set of security requirements. We furthermore present the new concept of a history-enriched SCT that meets all but one of these requirements. The context history includes information on all security mechanisms used prior to the handover in question as well as information on how the transfered cryptographic keys were derived. MDs and networks determine their handover policies dependent on this context history. Consequently, the new procedure not only protects all participants in the handover from attacks arising from the use of any sort of weak mechanisms before this handover but also enables the inter-operation of providers supporting different security levels. Moreover, our procedure explicitly specifies a method to negotiate the security mechanisms to use after handover that not only takes MD's and DEST's policies but also policies of previously serving networks into account. This helps to protect against attacks arising from the use of weak mechanisms after handover.
Outline: In Section 2 we provide the model for an inter-provider handover procedure and introduce the security architecture of the wireless access technology in question. In Section 3 we define the new requirements for SCT followed by the new history-enriched policy-based approach in Section 4. We close this paper by summarizing previous work on SCT (Section 5).
Model
Each mobile device is pre-registered with a dedicated network, its Home Network (HN). In a preregistration process, MD and HN exchange credentials (e.g., a shared secret key, or public key certificates, or combinations of user names and passwords). HN usually has roaming agreements with a number of Foreign Networks (FN). Based on these roaming agreements and the credentials exchanged with HN, MD and a network (i.e., HN or any FN that has a roaming agreement with HN) can authenticate each other by means of an authentication protocol a and agree upon a master session key by means of a key agreement protocol ka.
We use the term Anchor Network (AN) to denote the network to which MD authenticated itself first. AN can either be HN, or any FN to which MD has roamed to. Upon roaming to AN, MD and AN first negotiate the authentication and key agreement protocols a 0 and ka 0 to be used as well as the encryption and integrity protection mechanisms em 0 and im 0 to be used after successful authentication. By means of the master session key K 0 and a key establishment process ke, MD and AN establish data protection keys EK 0 and IK 0 to be used for encryption and integrity protection. Upon successful authentication, AN and MD share the security context S 0 = (K 0 , a 0 , ka 0 , ke 0 , em 0 , im 0 ss0 ). We refer to S 0 as the initial security context.
An inter-provider handover procedure consists of three phases. In the first phase, the reason for handover is detected (e.g., a decrease in the reception level of the currently serving network access point) by MD (mobile-initiated handover), the currently serving network (network-initiated handover) or by the currently serving network with help of measurement data provided by MD (mobile-assisted handover). In a second phase, a candidate destination network is selected and in the third phase the handover itself is carried out. The second and third phase can either be controlled by the network (network-controlled handover) or by the mobile device (mobile-controlled handover). Due to the page limitations, we focus our discussion on mobile-assisted, network-controlled handover only.
A first order handover is a handover from AN as source network SRC 1 to a destination network DEST 1 . A second order (k-th order) handover is a handover from DEST 1 = SRC 2 (DEST k−1 = SRC k ) to a destination network DEST 2 (DEST k ). In the following we refer to handover of second or higher order as subsequent handover.
1 A k-th order handover includes the 1 Previous work on SCT-based inter-provider handover ( [2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9] ) model only the currently serving source network and transfer of a security context S k to DEST k . The components of the security context are detailed in Section 4.
Our model of the anchor network, the initial security context, and the subsequently serving networks leads to three new control types for subsequent handover reflecting different types of handover agreements between access networks: SRC-controlled handover, ANcontrolled handover, and HN-controlled handover.
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SRC-controlled handover:
In SRC-controlled procedures, the source network SRC k of a k-th order handover determines the handover reason, selects the candidate destination network and initiates as well as authorizes the actual handover. A handover of MD from SRC k to DEST k can take place if SRC k and DEST k have a handover agreement. The HN of MD is only involved in the k-th order handover procedure if it is the source or destination network. Consequently, HN delegates the control of a first order handover to AN, AN delegates the control of a second order handover to DEST 1 = SRC 2 and so on. MD is assured of SRC k 's authorization of the handover as soon as it receives a handover command message from SRC k . Similarly, SRC k 's authorization of the handover is assured to DEST k in form of a handover request. In case of commercial network access providers, SRC k 's authorization includes its guarantee to reimburse DEST k for service provisioning. For a mobile device, a SRCcontrolled handover implies transitive trust in the network providers: MD trusts HN's authorization by means of the initial authentication between MD and AN. Subsequently, MD trusts handover commands received from AN = SRC 1 , DEST 1 = SRC 2 and so on.
AN-controlled handover:
In an AN-controlled k-th order handover, AN determines the handover reason (with the help of SRC k ), selects the candidate destination network and initiates as well as authorizes the actual handover. MD accepts handover commands originating from AN only. A handover of MD from SRC k to DEST k can take place if DEST k and AN have a handover agreement. It is AN that assures MD of DEST k 's authorization to offer service after handover. Similarly, AN assures DEST k that MD is authorized to be handed over to DEST k . In case of commercial network access providers, AN's authorization of the handover provides DEST k with the guarantee that AN will reimburse DEST k for its service provisioning.
HN-controlled handover:
In an HN-controlled hanthe destination network of a handover. Consequently, previous solutions can be interpreted as addressing first order handover only or as ignoring the impact of previous handover. 2 We assume that within one technology only one type of handover procedures will be standardized, such that all subsequent handover are of the same control type.
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dover procedure, SRC k determines that a handover reason occurred and informs HN. HN selects the candidate destination network and initiates as well as authorizes the actual handover. MD accepts handover commands that originate from its HN only. A handover to DEST k can take place if HN and DEST k have a handover agreement. It is HN that assures DEST k that MD is authorized to be handed over to DEST k . In case of commercial providers, HN's authorization provides DEST k with the guarantee that HN will reimburse DEST k for its service provisioning. Figure 1 describes a network-initiated handover procedure. HCN stands for the Handover Controlling Network. Depending on the type of handover control, HCN is to be replaced by HN, AN or SRC k . Before a k-th order handover, MD is connected to SRC k . MD and SRC k use some encryption mechanism em k−1 and some integrity protection mechanism im k−1 to protect data and signaling traffic with some keys EK k−1 and IK k−1 established by means of some key establishment process ke k−1 . MD may support SRC k in detecting a handover reason. Upon detecting a reason for an inter-provider handover, SRC k sends a handover indication message to HCN. This includes MD's identity as well as measurement data regarding the quality of MD's reception of candidate networks. HCN uses the measurement data and possibly other information on the candidate networks to determine an ordered list of candidate destinations L = {DEST 
Security Requirements
In this section we define requirements to secure subsequent inter-provider handover. Requirements R-1 to R-3 address security problems in a k-th order handover that arise from previous handover. Requirements R-4 to R-8 address security problems that are independent of any previous handover, but arise from the newlyspecified, different types of handover control.
3 R-1 DEST k shall base its decision on whether to accept or refuse a given handover request on (1) the so-called cipher suites cs 0 = (ke 0 , em 0 , im 0 ), . . . , cs k−1 = (ke k−1 , em k−1 , im k−1 ) previously used between MD and any of the previously serving networks; (2) the initial authentication protocol a 0 ; (3) the initial key agreement protocol ka 0 ; and (4) the method used to derive the master key K k (to be used after handover). For example, this allows DEST k to reject a handover request if 'no integrity protection' and 'no encryption' was used between SRC k and MD and thus, e.g., protects DEST k against accepting the handover request for an attacker that managed to impersonate a victim MD to SRC k . R-2 Knowledge of a master session key K k (used by MD and DEST k after handover) shall not reveal any information on any previously used master session key
. E.g., this protects SRC j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), MD, and HCN from attacks due to the use of weak security mechanisms after the k-th order handover and malicious destination networks that exploit their knowledge of K k .
R-3
Knowledge of a previously used master session key K j (0 ≤ j ≤ k −1) shall not reveal any information on K k to anyone except MD and DEST k . This protects, for example, DEST k and MD from attacks arising from weak security mechanisms used between MD and any previously serving network. It also protects DEST k from any malicious SRC j (1 ≤ j ≤ k) that exploits its knowledge of K j . R-4 The negotiation of the cipher suite cs k = (em k , im k , ke k ) to be used after the k-th order handover shall enforce compliance with policies set by HCN, MD, and DEST k . It is crucial for HCN to influence the selection of mechanisms to be used after handover as otherwise it may suffer from, e.g., impersonation attacks due to the use of a weak cipher suite cs k . R-5 The negotiation of the cipher suite cs k shall be protected against bidding down attacks.
R-6
The security context shall include information on the lifetime of the initial master session key K 0 .
This, for example, allows DEST k to have considerations on the key lifetime be part of its handover decision. It furthermore allows HCN to pass on its restrictions on key lifetimes to DEST k .
R-7
The security context transfer between HCN and DEST k on a k-th order handover shall be integrity protected (including replay protection) and shall provide a proof of its origin (HCN) to DEST k . Furthermore, the security context transfer shall be encrypted in case it includes any confidential information. R-8 The handover command message shall always be integrity protected (including replay protection) and provide a proof of its origin (HCN) to MD.
History-Enriched SCT
In the following we detail a concept that will meet the requirements R-1, R-2 and R-5 to R-8 for subsequent handover. While our solution for the SCRcontrolled case does not meet R-3, our solutions for the HN-controlled and the AN-controlled cases meet R-3 in part. The new components of our solutions are a context history, key derivation methods for each control type, a specification of policies and handover agreements, as well as the handover procedure itself, including a new negotiation method for cs k .
Context History:
In order to allow for DEST k to base its handover decision on the security mechanisms used before handover (R-1), we add the following security suite history ssh k−1 to the context transfered during a k-th order handover ssh k−1 = (ss 0 , cs 1 , . . . cs k−1 ). We also add T k−1 to the context to provide information on the total lifetime of the initial security context at the time of initiation of the k-th order handover.
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Key Derivation: The key derivation depends on who controls the handover. In an SRC-controlled handover, MD, SRC k−1 and SRC k negotiate a key derivation function kd k−1 as part of the security mechanism negotiation on the (k − 1)-st order handover. kd k−1 is included in the security context S k which DEST k receives from SRC k during the k-th order handover. We require kd k−1 to be a pre-image resistant hash function (see [4] for a precise definition) that takes K k−1 , DEST k 's identity, and a fresh random number r as input and derives master session key K k . The pre-image resistance guarantees that knowledge of K k does not reveal any information on any previously used master session key K j (0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) (R-2). However, knowledge of any previous key and the identities of the previously serving networks implies knowledge of K k . Consequently, R-3 can not be met by this key derivation method. In particular, SRC k and any previously serving network SRC j (1 ≤ j ≤ k) gain knowledge of K k . In an AN-controlled handover, MD and AN negotiate a pre-image resistant hash function as key derivation function kd 0 during the negotiation of the initial security suite ss 0 . This key derivation function is included in any subsequent security context transfer S k . Again, kd 0 takes K 0 , DEST k 's identity, and a fresh random number r as input and derives a master session key K k . The pre-image resistance again guarantees that R-2 it met. The fact that AN (and MD) derive K k from K 0 additionally guarantees that knowledge of K j (1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) does not reveal any information on K k . However, it is important to note that knowledge of K 0 reveals all subsequently used K j (1 ≤ j ≤ k). Consequently, this key derivation method meets R-3 in part. In an HN-controlled handover, MD and HN negotiate a key derivation function kd 0 as part of the pre-registration process. HN either obtains knowledge of the initial master session key K 0 during the (roaming) authentication between AN and MD, or AN transfers K 0 to HN as part of the handover indication message. K k is derived from K 0 in the same was as in the AN-controlled case. Again, this key derivation method meets R-2 and guarantees that the knowledge of K j (1 ≤ j ≤ k−1) does not reveal any information on K k . However, AN as well as HN may gain knowledge of all of the subsequently used master session keys. Consequently, R-3 is again met in part.
Policies: MD, HCN and any destination network DEST each have policies w.r.t. which cipher suites they allow to be used after a k-th order handover, (0 ≤ k ≤ h), h ∈ N, given any particular security suite history ssh k−1 . They express these policies by pre-defining sets H MD | ssh k−1 , H HCN | ssh k−1 , and H DEST | ssh k−1 of cipher suites cs = (ke, em, im) for any possible security suite history ssh k−1 . MD, HCN and DEST set H MD | ssh k−1 , H HCN | ssh k−1 or H DEST | ssh k−1 to be empty iff they do not allow for handover for a particular security suite history ssh k−1 at all. Furthermore, MD, HCN and DEST each have a policy setting an upper bound on how long an initial security context may be used. To express this policy, MD, HCN and DEST each define a threshold T r MD , T r DEST , respectively T r HCN .
Handover Agreement: HCN and DEST enter a handover agreement that regulates terms and conditions (including, e.g., accounting issues) for HCN-controlled k-th order handover to DEST (1 ≤ k ≤ h). The handover agreement includes an exchange of credentials that allow HCN and DEST to establish an authenticated and encrypted channel.
As part of the handover agreement, DEST commits to its handover policies by providing HCN with super-
Committing to a superset rather than H DEST | ssh k−1 for each 1 ≤ k ≤ h provides DEST with some degree of flexibility. It allows DEST to further restrict its handover policy over time but yet explicitly exclude specific security suite histories after which it will not allow handover at all, already at the time of entering the handover agreement. In turn, DEST's commitment allows HCN to pre-select candidate networks and consequently, e.g., avoid requesting handover to a destination network in vain.
Similarly, DEST commits to an upper boundary u DEST on T r DEST . This again helps HCN to preselect candidate destination networks and allows DEST to lower its threshold without prior notice to HCN.
Handover Procedure: Upon detecting a handover reason, HCN determines an ordered list L of candidate destination networks it has a handover agreement with.
HCN picks the first network DEST ceipt of the handover command M D checks whether T k−1 ≤ T r MD . In the positive case, MD and DEST k use the negotiated ke k to establish keys EK k and IK k for encryption and integrity protection.
We suggest the following method to negotiate the cipher suite cs k to be used after handover: MD sends H MD | ssh k−1 to SRC k , e.g., during connection establishment. Upon detecting a handover reason, SRC k forwards H MD | ssh k−1 to HCN. HCN computes the intersection of H HCN | ssh k−1 and H MD | ssh k−1 and includes the result in the handover request to DEST k . DEST k in turn computes the intersection of the received set of cipher suites with H DEST k | ssh k−1 and selects a cipher suite cs k from this intersection. DEST k informs HCN of its choice as part of the handover response. HCN checks whether cs k complies with its policy, i.e., whether cs k ∈ H DEST k | ssh k−1 . If so, it includes cs k in the handover command message sent to MD.
6 MD checks whether cs k complies with its policy. In not, MD drops the connection to SRC k .
Obviously, the above negotiation methods takes the policies of DEST k , SRC k as well as MD into account. However, it leaves the final choice of the cipher suite to DEST k , such that DEST k can choose the cipher suite it prefers most. DEST k may easily ignore preferences indicated by MD or HCN. Depending on the application scenario, leaving the final choice to HN or MD may seem more suitable. We will provide details on alternative negotiation methods in the extended version of this paper.
In order to protect the negotiation against bidding down attacks, HCN and MD have to ensure that the transfer of H MD | ssh k−1 from MD to HCN over SRC k is integrity protected. In case HCN is AN, MD can protect the transfer with IK 0 , im 0 . In case HCN is SRC k , MD can protect the transfer with IK k−1 and im k−1 . Finally, in case HCN is HN, MD again uses IK 0 (derived from K 0 which is known to HN). In addition, HCN and DEST k have to ensure that the handover request message as well as the handover response message exchanged between them are integrity protected by means of the keys derived from the credentials they share in order to meet R-5.
Handling Long Histories With every subsequent handover, the security suite history is extended by one cipher suite cs and in the SRC-controlled case also by one key derivation function kd. The actual number of occurring subsequent handover depends on the size of each of the subsequently serving networks, the speed of MD, the duration of an ongoing connection as well as the path MD takes through each of the networks.
The easiest way to reduce the length of the key history is to omit the order and frequency of appearance of a cipher suite. The length of the key history is thus reduced to the number of cipher suites specified for the wireless technology in question. It is, however, important to note that omitting the order and frequency reduces the flexibility of MD, SRC k and DEST k in setting their policies and may thus reduce their ability to secure themselves against attacks arising from the subsequent use of certain cipher suites. However, whether or not this is a serious restriction, depends on the technology in question and can not be further resolved with the level of abstraction applied in this paper.
Other ways to limit the length of key histories are to restrict the number of allowed subsequent handover to a certain value set by HCN, or to transfer some notion of security levels of the so far used cipher suites rather then the actual suites. Details on these methods will be discussed in the extended version of this paper.
Related Work
SCT has recently been discussed in the context of first order inter-provider handover [1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9] . This previous work defines security requirements equivalent to R-2, R-8 and R-7 but restricted to first order handover only. Similarly, [7, 8] consider R-3 for first order handover only. In contrast, the requirements R-1, R-5, R-4 or R-6 are neither defined nor addressed in previous work. The authors of [1, 2, 3, 7] , concentrate on how SCT potentially allows for faster inter-provider handover but address only R-8 and R-7. It is only in [6, 8, 9] that the first order variant of R-2 is addressed and only Wang et al. [8] also address R-3 in the first order variant. In [6] Soltwisch et al. suggest to derive K 0 from K 1 by adding a random number r 1 to K 0 . Upon transfer to MD, r 1 is integrity protected but yet sent in the clear. By construction, SRC (respectively DEST) as well as any attacker that obtained knowledge of K 0 (respectively K 1 ) can thus easily obtain K 1 (respectively K 0 ) by intercepting r 1 . Consequently, this key derivation method neither meets R-2 nor R-3. Zhang et al. [9] suggest to derive K 1 by means of a pseudorandom function with K 0 and a random number r 1 as input. As in [6] , r 1 is transfered to MD in the clear. However, the use of the pseudo-random function as key derivation function guarantees that R-2 is partly met. R-3 is not adressed. Wang et al. [8] suggest to derive K 1 in the same way as in [6] . However, the currently serving network transfers K 1 to MD encrypted with an encryption key EK 0 shared between SRC and MD. This key derivation method meets R-2. However, an attacker that gained knowledge of EK 0 can intercept and decrypt the key transfer and thus obtain K 1 . It is, in our opinion, not a good solution to transfer the future master key to MD protected by the old data protection keys. Furthermore, by construction, the source network in their handover procedure gains knowledge of K 1 . In order to meet R-3, Wang et al. suggest to use the transfered master key K 1 to authenticate a DiffieHellman key-exchange between MD and DEST after handover and derive data protection keys for use after handover from the exchanged key. However, the authors fail to notice that by knowledge of K 0 , the source network (or any attacker with knowledge of K 0 ) can mount a man-in-the-middle attack against the keyexchange. Consequently, R-3 cannot be met by this method.
Future Work
In this paper we assume that all subsequent handover are of the same control type. Changing control types on subsequent handover leads to a number of interesting questions with respect to the trust relationships between the networks that require further investigation. Furthermore, future work includes exploring the possible use of the key-splitting approach for inter-provider roaming suggested in [5] . The goal is to develop a key agreement method for HN-controlled handover that enables MD and DEST k to derive a master session key in a way such that the remaining requirement is met as well. That is, the knowledge of K j (0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) does not reveal any information on the master session key K k .
